Given a program P we specify an enlargement of its Well Founded Model which gives meaning to the adding of Closed World Assumptions. We do so by proposing the desirable principles of a Closed World Assumption (CWA), and proceed to formally de ne and apply them to Well Founded Semantics (WFS), in order to obtain a WFS added with CWA, the O-semantics. After an introduction and motivating examples, there follow the presentation of the concepts required to formalize the model structure, the properties it enjoys, and the criteria and procedures which allow the precise characterization of the preferred unique maximal model that gives the intended meaning to the O-Semantics of a program, the O-Model. Some properties are also exhibited that permit a more expedite obtention of the models. Several detailed examples are introduced throughout to illustrate the concepts and their application. Comparison is made with other work, and in the conclusions the novelty of the approach is brought out.
Introduction and Motivation
Well Founded Semantics 14] has been proposed as a suitable semantics for general logic programs. Its Extended Stable Models (XSM) 12, 13] version, and the inclusion of a second type of negation, have been explored as a framework for formalizing a variety of forms of non-monotonic reasoning 10, 11] and generalized to deal with contradiction removal and counterfactuals 7, 8, 9] . The increasing rôle of logic programming extensions as an encompassing framework for these and other AI topics is expounded at length in 4], where they argue, and we concur, that WFS is by design overly careful in deciding about the falsity of some atoms, leaving them unde ned, and that a suitable form of CWA can be used to safely and undisputably assume false some of the atoms absent from the well founded model of a program. Consider the following example adapted from 3], itself a variant of the "game" example expressing that "X is a winning position if there is a move from X to Y and Y is not a winning position", "in a winning position bets are raised", and that "we can move from position a to position a, and from position b to c".
c is not a winning position since it is impossible to move from c: b is a winning position because it is possible to move from b to c and c is not a winning position. a is a position of draw.
Neither win(a) nor win(a) should hold. This is correctly handled by WFS which assigns the truth{value unde ned to win(a):
The semantics of this program should also capture the intended meaning that bets are not raised in a position of draw. This is not captured by WFS which leave raisedBet(a) unde ned. 2 More abstractly, let P = fa a; c ag, where WFM(P) = fg. We argue that the intended meaning of the program may be f cg, since a may not be true in any extended stable model of P, by the rst rule, and so, the second rule cannot contradict the assigned meaning. Another way to understand this is that one may safely assume c using a form of CWA on c, since a may not be consistently assumed.
However, when relying on the absence of present evidence about some atom A, we do not always want to assume that A holds, since there may exist consistent assumptions allowing to conclude A. Roughly, we want to de ne the notion of concluding for the truth of a negative literal A just in case there is no hard nor hypothetical evidence to the contrary, i.e. no consistent set of negative assumptions such that A is untenable.
Consider P = fa b; b a; c ag: If we interpret the meaning of this program as its WFM (which is empty), and as we do not have a, a na ve CWA could be tempted to derive c based on the assumption a. There is however an alternative negative assumption b that, if made, defeats the assumption a, i.e. the assumption a may not be sustained since it can be defeated by the assumption b. We will de ne later more precisely the notions of sustainability and tenability.
Both programs above have empty well founded models. We argue that WFS is too careful, and something more can safely be added to the meaning of program, thus reducing the unde nedness of the program, if we are willing to adopt a suitable form of CWA.
We contend that a set CWA(P) of negative literals (assumptions) added to a program model MOD(P) by CWA must obey the four principles:
1. MOD(P) CWA(P) 6 j = L for any L 2 CWA(P). This says that the program model added with the set of assumptions identi ed by the CWA rule must be consistent. 2 . There is no other set of assumptions A such that MOD(P) A j = L for some L 2 CWA(P). I.e. CWA(P) is sustainable. 3 . CWA(P) must be unique. 4 . CWA(P) must, additionally, be maximal.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present some basic de nitions. In section 3 we introduce some new de nitions, capturing the concepts behind the semantics, accompanied by examples illustrating them. Models are de ned and organized into a lattice, and the class of sustainable A-Models is identi ed. In section 5 we de ne the O-Semantics of a program P based on the class of maximal sustainable tenable A-Models. A unique model is singled out as the O-Model of P: Afterwards we present some properties of the class of A-Models. Finally, we relate to other semantics and present conclusions.
Language
Here we give basic de nitions and establish notation ( 6] ). A program is a set of rules of the form: H B 1 ; : : : ; B n ; C 1 ; : : : ; C m (n 0; m 0) or equivalently H fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g fC 1 ; : : : ; C m g; where fA 1 ; : : : ; A n g is a shorthand for f A 1 ; : : : ; A n g; and C is short for fC1; : : : ; C m g; H, B i and C j are atoms.
The Herbrand Base B(P) of a program P is de ned as usual as the set of all ground atoms. An interpretation I of P is denoted by T F, where T and F are disjoint subsets of B(P): Atoms in T are said to be true in I, atoms in F false in I, and atoms in B(P) ? (T F) unde ned in I.
In an interpretation T F a conjunction of literals fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g fC 1 ; : : : ; C m g is true i fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g T and fC 1 ; : : : ; C m g F is false i fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g \ F 6 = ; or fC 1 ; : : : ; C m g \ T 6 = ;
is unde ned i it is neither true nor false.
Adding Negative Assumptions to a Program
Here we show how to consistently add negative assumptions to a program P. Informally, it is consistent to add a negative assumption to P if the assumption atom is not among the consequences P after adding the assumption. We also de ne when a set of negative assumptions is defeated by another, and show how the models of a program, for di erent sets of negative assumptions added to it, are organized into a lattice.
We begin by de ning what it means to add assumptions to a program. This is achieved by substituting true for the assumptions, and false for their atoms, in the body of all rules.
De nition 3.1 (P+A) The program P + A obtained by adding to a program P a set of negative assumptions A B(P) is the result of:
Deleting all rules H fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g C from P such that some Among these models we de ne the partial order a in the following way: hA 1 ; M 1 i a hA 2 ; M 2 i i A 1 A 2 : On the basis of set union and set intersection among the sets A of negative assumptions, the set of all A-Models becomes organized as a complete lattice.
Having de ned assumption models we next consider their consistency. According to the CWA principles above, an assumption A cannot be added to a program P if by doing so A is itself a consequence of P, or some other assumption is contradicted. The only sustainable models in example 2 are hfg; fgi and hf bg; fcgi: Note that the consistent A-Model hf cg; fgi is defeated by hf bg; fcgi, i.e. the assumption c is unsustainable since there is a set of consistent assumptions (namely f bg) that leads to the conclusion c. 2
The assumptions part of maximal sustainable A-Models of a program P are maximal sets of consistent Closed World Assumptions that can be safely added to the consequences of P without risking contradiction by other assumptions. 
The O-semantics
This section is concerned with the problem of singling out, among all sustainable A-Models of a program P, one that uniquely determines the meaning of P when the CWA is enforced. This is accomplished by means of a selection criterium that takes a lower semilattice of sustainable A-Models and obtains a subsemilattice of it, by deleting A-Models that in a well{de ned sense are less preferable, i.e. the untenable ones.
Sustainability of a consistent set of negative assumptions insists that there be no other consistent set that defeats it (i.e. there is no hypothetical evidence whose consequences contradict the sustained assumptions). Tenability requires that a maximal sustainable set of assumptions be not contradicted by the consequences of adding to it another competing (nondefeating and nondefeated) maximal sustainable set.
The selection process is repeated and ends up with a complete lattice of sustainable A-Models, which de nes for every program P its O-Semantics. The meaning of P is then speci ed by the greatest A-Model of the semantics, its O-Model.
To illustrate the problem of preference among maximal A-Models we introduce an example. Remark 4.1 At this point, we are in a position to make an important remark. Our goal is to maximally reduce unde nedness of the well{founded model by adding to it negative assumptions. Now, the peeling process of subtracting only maximal untenable A-Models from candidate structures ends up with a retained candidate structure with a maximal element. So we must guarantee this element is always greater or equal than the result we would obtain if we didn't require untenable A{Models to be maximal in de nition 4.2. This is indeed guaranteed, for the join of the maximal elements of each candidate structure is always greater than any join of non{maximal elements of that structure, and because the maximal element of the retained lattice is by de nition one such join of maximal elements.
Example 10 shows that if untenable A{Models were not de ned as maximal then a smaller O{Model would be obtained. Proof: Since every candidate structure is a semilattice of sustainable AModels, it is enough to prove that the join J = hA J ; M J i of the retained candidate structure CS of the semilattice of all sustainable A-Models of P is a sustainable A-Model.
If we assume that J is inconsistent then at least one maximal A-Model in CS is untenable. Accordingly, since in the nal retained CS there are, by de nition, no untenable A-Models, J is consistent. Its only consistent A-Models are hfg; fgi, hf pg; fqgi and hf qg; fgi.
As this last one is defeated by the second, the only sustainable ones are the rst two. Since only one is maximal, these two A-Models determine the O-Semantics, and the meaning of P is f p; qg, its O-Model. Note that if the three last rules, forming an "unde ned loop", are replaced by another "unde ned loop" a a; the O-model is the same. This is as it should, since the rst two rules conclude nothing about a: 2 Example 8 Let P : 
Properties of Sustainable A-Models
This section explores properties of sustainable A-Models that provide a better understanding of them, and also give hints for their construction without having to previously calculate all A-Models.
We begin with properties that show how our models can be viewed as an extension to Well Founded Semantics (WFS). As mentioned in 6], negation in WFS is based on the notion of support, i.e. a literal L only belongs to an Extended Stable Model (XSM) if all the rules for L (if any) have false bodies in the XSM. In contradistinction, we are interested in negations as consistent hypotheses that cannot be defeated. To that end we weaken the necessary (but not su cient) conditions for a negative literal to belong to a model as explained below. We still want to keep the necessary and su cient conditions of support for positive literals. More precisely, knowing that XSMs must obey, among others, the following conditions cf. 6]:
If If p 2 M then all rules for p have false bodies in M (necessity of support for negative literals). Our consistent A-models, when understood as the union of their pair of elements, assumptions A and WFM(P + A), need not obey the fourth condition. Foregoing it condones making negative assumptions. In our models an atom might be false even if it has a rule whose body is unde ned. Thus, only false atoms with an unde ned rule body are candidates for having their negation added to the WFM(P). Thus there exists a rule p B in P +A such that B WFM(P +A) = M.
Given that the WFM of any program must obey the rst condition above, p 2 WFM(P + A). } Next we state properties useful for more directly nding the sustainable A-Models. Proposition 6.2 There exists no consistent A-Model hA; Mi of P with f ag A such that a 2 WFM(P). Proof: We begin by proving the proposition for f ag = A:
Since a 2 WFM(P), then by propositions A.1 and A.2 there is a SS P (a) = S such that a 6 2 S and a 6 2 S; and consequently Rules(S) P + f ag: Then, by proposition A.3, a2WFM(P +f ag), and thus hf ag; WFM(P + f ag)i is inconsistent.
It follows, from lemma 3.1, that all A-Models hA; Mi such that f ag A are inconsistent. } Hence, A-Models not obeying the above restriction are not worth considering as sustainable. hA; Mi is inconsistent (its corresponding atom is true in WFM(P) and false in M A). If it is an element of B this theorem applies recursively, ending up in a rule with empty body, an atom with no rules or a loop without an interposing l. As shown below the truth value of literals in these conditions can never be changed:
Since the P + A operation only involves deleting rules with literals at the body and literals from the body of rules, the truth value of atoms without rules is always false no matter which A is being considered, and the truth value of atoms with a fact is always false. Literals in a loop without interposing l are false in P; and remain false if rules of the loop are deleted. The EWFS 1] is also an extension to the WFM based on the notion of GCWA 5] . Roughly, EWFS moves closer than the WFM (in the sense of being less unde ned) to being the intersection of all minimal Herbrand models of P. With a di erent notation from that of 1]:
EWFM(P) = def WFM(P) T(WFM(P)) F(WFM(P)) where:
T(I) = def True(MIN MOD(I; P)); F(I) = def False(MIN MOD(I; P))
I is a three{valued interpretation, and MIN MOD(I; P) is the collection of all minimal two{valued Herbrand models of P consistent with I: For a set S of interpretations, True(S) (resp. False(S)) denotes the set of all atoms which are true (resp. false) in all interpretations of S: For the program P = fa ag we have: WFM(P) = fg; MIN MOD(fg; P) = ffagg and EWFM(P) = fag Note this view identi es the intended meaning of rule a a as the equivalent logic formula a :a, i.e. a: The O-Model of P is empty.
The main di erences between ours and their approach are that: Like WFS and unlike EWFM, we insist on the supportedness of positive literals, i. is not coherent because then we would expect the special case a a to be construed as a; which they don't. 2 
Conclusions
We identify the meaning of a program P as a suitable partial closure of the well founded model of the program in the sense that it contains the well founded model (and thus always exists). The extension we propose reduces unde nedness (which some authors argue is a desirable property) in the intended meaning of a program P, by an adequate form of CWA based on notions of consistency, sustainability and tenability with regard to alternative negative assumptions. Sustainability of a consistent set of negative assumptions insists that there be no other consistent set that defeats it (i.e. there is no hypothetical evidence whose consequences contradict the sustained assumptions). Tenability requires that a maximal sustainable set of assumptions be not contradicted by the consequences of adding to it another competing (nondefeating and nondefeated) maximal sustainable set.
A Support Sets
In this section we recall the de nition and some properties of support sets, introduced By considering all possible rules of P for a literal all its SSs are obtained.
Here we de ne Rules(SS P (L)) P as the rules used in the de nition above to build SS P (L): Proposition A.1 (Existence of Support Set) Every literal L belonging to the WF Model of a program P has at least one support set SS P (L).
Since by de nition every literal L with a support set SS P (L) belong to the WFM of P; we can say that a literal has at least one support set i it belongs to the WFM.
Other properties of support sets, which are used in some proofs of this paper, are presented below. Proposition A.2 For any atom A such that A 2 WFM(P); there is at least one support set S of A such that A 6 2 S and A 6 2 S: Proposition A.3 Let P be a program, A 2 WFM(P) be an atom, and SS P (A) a support set of A: Then A 2 WFM(P 0 ) for every program P 0 such that: Rules(SS P (A)) P 0 P
